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I. INTRODUCTION
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons ("CCW") is a
treaty based upon the principles of international law that weapons used
for engagement in armed conflict should not cause unnecessary injury
and suffering. Eighty-two states are party to this treaty and continue to
negotiate and ratify additional protocols that ban the use of specific
weapons.2 In May 2014, the CCW held its first meeting on the topic of
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems ("AWS").3 The specific mandate
of the meeting was to discuss emerging technologies in the area of AWS,
and was generally regarded as a preliminary discussion, in an area of
rapid technological change.4 Another meeting was held in April 2015 .
During the 2014 meeting, sessions were held on the ethical,
sociological, military, and legal aspects of AWS, which included
technical aspects on how to define autonomy and how autonomy can be
measured. Amongst this discussion was the idea of adopting the treaty
language of "meaningful human control" ("MHC") as a way to measure
autonomy and/or regulate AWS.6 The purpose of this paper is to question
the concept of MHC and how it may or may not be a useful legal tool for
regulating AWS.
Part II of this paper will provide a working definition of autonomy
for the sake of creating a common understanding within this paper. It
will then explain the current status of AWS technology and what
possibilities the future holds for autonomy. Part III will discuss state
reactions to MHC and the current legal system that already regulates
AWS. Part IV will then critique what it may mean for states to comply
with MHC and what challenges may be presented by implementation
through taking a closer look at the "human control" in MHC. Part V of
I Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate
Effects as Amended on 21 December 2001 Preamble, Dec. 21, 2001,19 I.L.M.
1523,1524.
2 United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Amendment to Article I of the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate (last visited
Jan. 5, 2016),
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&m
tdsg no=XXVI-2-c&chapter=26&ang-en#Participants.
3 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Sys. (LAWS), May
13-16, 2014, Report ¶ 13-16 CCW/MSP/2014/3 (June 11,2014).
4 Id.
5 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Sys. (LAWS), May
13-16, 2014, Revised Annotated Programme of Work, CCW/MSP/2015/WP.I/Rev.1
(Mar. 11, 2015).
6 Supra note 3, at T 20.
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this paper will analyze the "meaningful" aspect of MHC, and to what
degree humans can, will, or should delegate tasks to autonomous
systems. Theories of automation bias, automation complacency, and their
role in the field of AWS as well as other fields will be discussed. Part VI
will offer concluding remarks on why MHC appears useful because of its
simplicity, but fails to be useful in application because of its vagueness.
II. DEFINING AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS
a. Definitions and Distinguishing Autonomous from Automated
There is no internationally agreed upon meaning for AWS, but there
are working definitions that may be used as guidance for developing
legal analysis within this paper. At a recent International Committee of
the Red Cross ("ICRC") meeting regarding the issue, AWS were defined
as, "weapons that can independently select and attack targets, i.e. with
autonomy in the 'critical functions' of acquiring, tracking, selecting and
attacking targets." 7 This was the definition used at the ICRC meeting that
included representatives from 21 states, along with 13 independent
experts.' The U.S. Department of Defense ("DoD") has more specifically
defined an AWS as,
[A] weapon system that, once activated, can select and
engage targets without further intervention by a human
operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous
weapon systems that are designed to allow human
operators to override operation of the weapon system,
but can select and engage targets without further human
input after activation.9
The DoD definition emphasizes the role of the human in defining
autonomy, but both definitions help give an outline of what autonomy
means, which will be necessary for the discussion below on regulation.
The definition cited is specific for what may be considered fully-
autonomous weapon systems, but the DoD also distinguishes semi-
autonomous weapons systems and human-supervised autonomous
weapon systems. The semi-autonomous weapons system is a system that
once activated is intended only to "engage individual targets or specific
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL,
MILITARY, LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS 7 (2014).
8 Id.
9 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.09: AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS, 13-14
(2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf.
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target groups that have been selected by a human operator."'o The
distinction between the semi-autonomous and the fully autonomous is
the actual selection of the targets. The human-supervised autonomous
weapons system is designed to "to provide human operators with the
ability to intervene and terminate engagements, including in the event of
a weapon system failure, before unacceptable levels of damage occur.""
Under the DoD definition, human-supervised AWS are a type of AWS,
but not all AWS must be human-supervised to fit within the definition of
AWS.
In continuing to develop a definition, it is important to note that
AWS are distinct from automated weapons systems. While often
confused, the difference is that an automated weapon system is designed
to attack a target once a pre-determined parameter has been breached,
while an autonomous weapon system can attack a target which it selected
independently.1 2 Both systems can operate without human involvement,
but AWS have the ability to select their own targets, rather than simply
attacking under only pre-defined conditions. A landmine triggered by
pressure would be a simple example of an automated weapon system,
while more modem examples include sentry guns, sensor-fused
ammunition, and most cruise missiles.' 3 Such a distinction is important
when it comes to understanding MHC because it raises questions of what
"human" means within MHC. There may already be automated systems
that are considered acceptable that do not have human involvement, so
what will this mean in terms of autonomous systems?
In addition to being distinct from automated weapon systems, AWS
are not to be confused with remotely piloted systems (i.e. an unmanned
aerial vehicle ("UAV") or "drone"). When a UAV is under pilot control,
it is not autonomous. Even if an in-flight UAV were to lose its
communication link with the ground-based pilot and have a set of pre-
programmed flight instructions to follow, that would make the aircraft
automated, but still not autonomous.1 4 The distinction of autonomy
between the two systems creates different legal issues for AWS than
those of automated weapon systems.
10 Id.
I Id.
12 Alan Backstrom & Ian Henderson, New Capabilities in Warfare: An Overview Of
Contemporary Technological Developments And The Associated Legal And Engineering
Issues In Article 36 Weapons Reviews. 94 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROss 483, 488 (2012).
13 Markus Wagner, The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal,
Ethical, and Political Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems, 47 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1371, 1382-83 (2014).
14 OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., UNMANNED INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ROADMAP 15
(2013).
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At points, this paper will discuss some of the legal issues that relate
to automated weapons systems which, while different from autonomy,
are still important in the discussion of AWS because of the way that
automation and autonomy can be thought of as falling on a spectrum.
However, even if automation and autonomy are viewed on a spectrum, it
is still important to distinguish and draw a line at some point for
purposes of legal regulation. Therefore, the line of distinction drawn for
the purpose of this paper will be the AWS definition used by the DoD.
b. Review of Current Developments ofA WS
The United States, along with a handful of other countries, has had a
dramatic increase in the number of UAVs that have been purchased and
have been in use by the military in the past 15 years. This is in part from
the demand that was created by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars,
developments in communication and navigation technologies, and the
benefit of a lowered risk to pilots.' 5 As evidenced by continued
investment for research and development, governments have been
generally supportive of this technology because of its reduction of
casualties and lower operational costs.1 6 Currently, autonomous and
remote-controlled capabilities support unmanned systems with the
intention to, "free warfighters from the dull, dirty, and dangerous
missions that might now be better executed robotically and enable
entirely new design concepts unlimited by the endurance and
performance of human crews."' 7 Some scholars explain that modem
military forces are driven in the direction of automation and autonomy
because of factors such as the increasing complexity of military
technology, the speed of modem weapons, and the need for an
immediate response to threats after evaluating vast amounts of
information." Additionally, because remote-controlled operations
require a direct communication link, autonomy is arguably a direction
the military needs to move in as a matter of necessity in case of
communication link failure.19
However, many would not consider the UAVs in use today to be
autonomous because they are remotely controlled by a pilot, and require
15 JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136, U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL
SYSTEMS 1-2 (2012).
16 Id. at 2-3.
17 OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., UNMANNED INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ROADMAP 34
(2007).
18 Jack M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GEO. J. INT'L
L. 617, 624-625 (2014).
19 Id.
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constant support and control from a ground crew. 20 This would not rise to
the level of fulfilling the DoD fully-AWS definition of a machine that
"once activated, can select and engage targets without further
intervention by a human operator." 2 ' Nonetheless, because of advances
in technology, others will argue that there are currently fully autonomous
weapons in existence. One example of such a weapon is the Israeli
HARPY UAV-based weapons system, which is a fire-and-forget weapon
system that can loiter for several hours before detecting, locking-on to,
and destroying enemy radars.22 It could arguably be considered
autonomous because there is no further human input after it is fired.
However, while these weapons are still in the realm of automated
weapon systems, they are cannot be classified as autonomous because
they select targets under a set of pre-defined conditions.
Some autonomy has been achieved in the refueling procedures
between two high-altitude unmanned aircraft. The refueling was done at
45,000 feet between a NASA Proteus aircraft and a Northrop Grumman
Global Hawk, and the Global Hawk demonstrated its ability to receive
fuel autonomously. 23 This is still a very small degree of autonomy and is
described by the DoD as "autonomous execution," representing the
autonomous system's ability to keep an aircraft in flight by compensating
for small disturbances it finds on a preprogrammed path.24 While this
may be described as "autonomous execution," under the DoD's Directive
3000.09, this does not meet the definition for AWS because it cannot
"select and engage targets without further intervention from a human
operator" once it has been activated.25 Neither would it fit under the
DoD's requirements for a semi-autonomous weapons system because the
degree of autonomy that has been obtained is still not related to the
selection of targets.26
With respect to the current development of autonomous technology,
there are also issues of operational usefulness and cost. There is criticism
that the MQ-9 Reaper may be more expensive than the benefits received
from it, despite its popularity with the public, Congress, and the DoD. 2 7
Criticisms include that the MQ-9 Reaper has a high cost to acquire and
20 GERTLER, supra note 15, at p. 13 n. 48 .
21 AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS, supra note 9.
22 ANTHONY FINN & STEVEN SCHEDING, DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES FOR
AUTONOMOUS UNMANNED VEHICLES: A COMPENDIUM 178 (Springer, 2010).
23 Landmark Flight Moves KQ-X Program Toward Unmanned Aerial Refueling, DEF.
DAILY (Mar. 9, 2011).
24 UNMANNED INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ROADMAP, supra note 14, at 66.
25 AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS, supra note 9, at 14.
26 Id.
27 Winslow T. Wheeler. MQ-9 Reaper Drone: Not a Revolution in Warfare, COMMON
DEF. Q., Summer 2012 at 27, 29.
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operate, it only has a limited weapons payload, and cannot survive even
minimal air defense. Much of the higher costs to operate come from the
extensive infrastructure that is required such as a manned ground control
station, a satellite link, and a local control unit for takeoff and landings,
many of which are costs that would not exist for a manned aircraft.28
While political considerations may determine decisions for military
funding, theses sorts of costs may also factor into future decisions in the
development of automated and autonomous weapon technology.
c. Future ofA WS
In contrast to its "autonomous execution" goals, the DoD hopes to
move further from automation toward autonomy in what it refers to as
"autonomous performance." 2 9  The concept of "autonomous
performance" includes a system programmed with algorithms to
integrate sensing, perceiving, analyzing, communicating, and planning so
that the system can eventually learn to make decisions for itself in-line
with the pre-assigned mission.30 These are all factors that will require
less human intervention in the operation of weapons systems. For
example, it is possible to imagine one integrated system that would
manage multiple aircraft in flight for coordinating formations and
maneuvering, and therefore reduce the need for pilots and crew.3 '
Within the foreseeable future, it is not likely that the technology will
develop for autonomous weapons to independently determine their own
actions and make complex decisions to adapt to their environment, but
for the sake of discussion, the assumption will be made that it is possible
at some point in the future.3 2 As one example, the current automatic
targeting capabilities of weapons only work in low-clutter environments
such as a ship at sea, but not in medium or high-clutter environments.
The challenges of developing autonomous technology comes from the
difficulty in programming a system for so many unforeseen factors that
can arise in warfare.33 Despite the difficulties in development, there is
still a need to consider the future implications of the law on such
machines, and MHC has been proposed as a way to govern these
questions.
28 Id. at 27-28.
29 UNMANNED INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ROADMAP, supra note 14, at 66.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 71.
32 AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL AND
HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS, supra note 7, at 16.
33 Id. at 30.
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III. MHC's PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The end goal of the CCW meetings is not completely clear. One
proposal is to draft a treaty that includes language that would only permit
autonomous weapons operated under MHC. This could come in the form
of an additional protocol that some states sign and ratify, or the CCW
discussions could simply be a way to put international pressure on states
to adopt their own rules which would incorporate MHC, such as the US
DoD Directive 3000.09, discussed further below. If MHC language is
included in any national rules, it will eventually have to be interpreted.
Another direction that meetings could take is toward an understanding
among most states that international law already requires MHC, and the
concept could become customary international law. Regardless of where
the endpoint is, a useful starting point is to understand the positions that
states have held at the CCW meetings.
a. State Reactions to MHC at CCW meetings
At the CCW Convention in May 2014, there was a "widely shared"
view that it is important to maintain MHC for decisions of life and
34death. Most states expressed the desire for continued discussion in an
area of complex, developing technology, and the view that the CCW was
the appropriate forum for doing so. Some states even took firm positions
on MHC, with Austria holding that weapons without MHC were already
in contravention to International Humanitarian Law ("IHL"). 35 At the
April 2015 meeting, Austria clarified that MHC "should not be seen as a
new legal norm, but as evaluating LAWS on the basis of existing
standards of international humanitarian law." 36 In 2014, India did not
take a position of accepting or rejecting the concept of MHC. 37 Pakistan
did not agree with the concept of MHC because it is too vague, but only
because the state held the position that there needs to be clear language
34 Michael Biontino, Germany Delegation Closing Statement to 2014 CCW Meeting of
Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, (May 16, 2014) (transcript available
at
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/AO38DEAIDA906F9DC1257DD9
0042E261?OpenDocument) [hereinafter "UN CCW 2014 LAWS meeting webpage"].
35 Austrian Delegation Closing Statement to 2014 CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems, (May 16, 2014) (transcript available at UN CCW 2014
LAWS meeting webpage).
36 Austrian Delegation to Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems (LAWS), The Concept Of "Meaningful Human Control," (United
Nations Office at Geneva, 2015), available at http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943
/(httpPages)/6CE049BE22EC75A2C1257C8D00513E26?OpenDocument.
37 Indian Delegation Closing Statement to 2014 CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems, (May 16, 2014) (audio recording available at UN CCW
2014 LAWS meeting webpage).
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that creates a complete ban on AWS through an additional protocol to the
CCW.3 8
The United States' position at the CCW Convention in April 2014
was that MHC, "does not sufficiently capture the full range of human
activity that takes place in weapon system development, acquisition,
fielding and use; including a particular commander's or an operator's
judgment to employ a particular weapon to achieve a particular effect on
a particular battlefield."3 9 Even though the understanding of MHC at the
meeting was still developing, the United States held the minority position
at the Convention, that MHC is not appropriate language for a treaty.
States held a wide variety of views on what MHC could imply and
whether or not it is even useful as a legal tool for regulation, but all did
agree that discussion should continue.
b. International Law Already Regulating A WS
Before delving deeper into what may be required for state
compliance with MHC, it will be useful to consider which fields of law
already govern the use of AWS. While MHC was debated at the CCW as
a way to regulate the use of AWS, that does not mean there is currently
no legal structure in place. There are already treaties and customary
international law with which states have obligations to comply.
The applicable international law in situations of armed conflict is
referred to as IHL.40 One important IHL consideration that has been
codified by treaty is Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Convention, which creates a rule for the legal review of new weapons
developed by a state. It provides that,
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a
new weapon, means or method of war, a High
Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine
whether its employment would, in some or all
circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any
38 Pakistan Delegation Closing Statement to 2014 CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems, (May 16, 2014) (audio recording available at UN CCW
2014 LAWS meeting webpage).
39 United States Delegation Closing Statement to 2014 CCW Meeting of Experts on
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, (May 16, 2014) (audio recording available at UN
CCW 2014 LAWS meeting webpage).
40 See generally INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW? (2004) available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
what is ihl.pdf.
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other rule or international law applicable to the High
Contracting Party.4 '
The requirements set by Article 36 mean that a state has an
obligation to review its new weapons to make sure that the weapons
comply with international law, and in the case of AWS, the applicable
international law would primarily be IHL. While this is an important
constraint upon states in the regulation of new weapons, it only imposes
regulation of currently existing laws.
Despite the lofty goals of Article 36, under the provision, states can
decide for themselves how they will analyze the expected use of a
weapon.42 Moreover, because of the secret nature of the weapons
reviewed, it is not likely that the review process would be made public. 4 3
These limitations to the Article 36 review process impede the process
from having real significance. At the same time, the United States is a
not a party to Additional Protocol I, but it does have its own review
mechanisms that require it to ensure that any weapons developed are
consistent with applicable treaties and customary international law.44
On the other hand, at the April 2015 CCW meeting, William
Boothby argued that under the current state of technology, most
offensive AWS will not be able to comply with the targeting
requirements of the weapons review that is currently required by
international law, demonstrating that the current IHL structure can
regulate AWS in some form. He went on to say that instead of a ban on
AWS, there should be a greater emphasis on enforcing the already
existing weapons review process.45 He suggests that in the future, the
Article 36 review process could be more useful because it will be a
method that allows international law to be complied with more reliably.
Even though Article 36 may not currently have a true ability to
regulate weapon development, IHL nonetheless governs weapon
development and implementation. IHL incorporates the important
41 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 36, June 8,
1977 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].
42 CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 424 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds.,
1987).
43 WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 343 (2009).
4 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5000.01: THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM, 7
(2007).
45 William H. Boothby, Presentation to the 2015 CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems (April 2015) (text available at http://www.unog.ch/
80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6CEO49BE22EC75A2C1257C8D00513E26?OpenDocu
ment) [hereinafter "UN CCW 2015 LAWS meeting webpage"].
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principles of distinction and proportionality, with distinction being
rooted in the idea that any individual that is not a combatant is a civilian
and proportionality being rooted in the idea of balancing military
advantage ex ante against civilian casualties. Consequently, states must
ensure that any future AWS meet the requirements of distinction and
proportionality in its targeting capabilities.
The principle of distinction is derived from Additional Protocol I of
the Geneva Convention which says that "Parties to [ . .. ] conflict shall at
all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall
direct their operations only against military objectives."46 The principle
of distinction specifically becomes difficult because it means that an
AWS must be able to receive data, and based on that information, decide
for itself whether or not the target is a combatant or a civilian. This may
be possible for a computer program to distinguish between a combatant
and a non-combatant with targets such as tanks or large military
installations, but it becomes more difficult when the AWS must
distinguish a combatant from a civilian.4 7 Consider the situation of a
civilian that may be wearing camouflage clothing simply for fashion, and
the necessity of a machine that can discern that the person is not a
combatant based on clothing. This is a simple example, but demonstrates
the type of programing necessary for AWS to perform a lawful act.
Proponents of a ban on AWS cite this technological obstacle as a reason
for illegality. On the other hand, some scholars argue that AWS
technology should not be approached from a per se illegal viewpoint, but
rather looked at with more legal scrutiny on an individual case by case
basis as to whether there is compliance with IHL.48 This argument is
more convincing because of the wide range of technology that AWS can
encompass. Additionally, some scholars argue that distinction may also
be an easy requirement for AWS to satisfy, because there may be certain
scenarios where there are no civilians present.49 It may or may not be the
case that in the majority of factual situations an AWS cannot be
programmed to comply with IHL, but that does not necessarily mean that
an AWS in a low-clutter, low-civilian situation could not comply with
IHL.
In compliance with IHL, proportionality can be even more difficult
to implement than distinction because it involves an analysis of the
legality of an armed attack by weighing the tactical military advantage
46 AP I, supra note 41, at art. 48.
47 Wagner, supra note 13 at, 1391-1392.
48 Id. at 1423-1424.
49 Jeffrey S. Thurnher, The Law that Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 17 AM.
Soc'Y OF INT'L LAW INSIGHTS (Jan. 18, 2013).
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against injury to civilians. As a principle, proportionality has also been
reflected in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention. It considers
an attack to be indiscriminate which "may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."5 0 This can
involve an infinite number of factors that vary greatly by situation. This
means that AWS must be able to interpret and weigh all the factors that
could go into civilian loss of life in an attack. Neither the factors of
"military advantage" or "civilian losses" are easy to quantify, and
therefore are difficult to balance against one another-a task as difficult
for a human as much as it would be to program for a machine. 5 In
addition to the balancing factors being difficult to quantify, the factors or
"military advantage" and "civilian losses" are also dissimilar, making
whatever proportionality found dissimilar as well.5 2 As noted above with
the principle of distinction, some scholars would argue that
proportionality may also be more easily achieved with AWS in
environments with few civilians. 53 All of these technological obstacles
create legal challenges for AWS, but as noted above with the principle of
distinction, the obstacles may not necessarily mean that compliance with
IHL is never possible. Compliance may only be a matter of technological
development.
The international legal regimes already mentioned have the greatest
impact on AWS, but there are others still that can have an impact such as
international human rights law, law of the sea, space law, and others.54
While all of these areas may impose constraints on AWS, an explanation
of the field of each area of law is beyond the scope of this paper. From
what was outlined above, it is imperative to consider that the current
legal framework of IHL may already be adequate for the regulation of
AWS. The rest of this paper will continue to explore an understanding of
MHC and the requirements it may add to the current legal system in an
attempt to regulate AWS, but that does not mean that IHL as it stands
now would not be sufficient for the purpose of regulation.
50 AP I, supra note 41, at art. 52(5)(b).
5 Supra note 13 at, 1393-1395.
52 William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional
Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 102 (1982).
53 Kenneth Anderson et al., Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous
Weapon Systems, 90 INT'L L. STUD. 386, 403 (2014).
54 See generally Rebecca Crootof The Varied Law of Autonomous Weapon Systems,
NATO ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION, AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS: ISSUES FOR
DEFENCE POLICY MAKERS (forthcoming 2016) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2569322.
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c. Example of US DoD Directive 3000.09
For the purpose of regulating its internal development of autonomous
weapon systems, the DoD has issued Directive 3000.09 ("Directive").
The Directive provides an example of what implementation of MHC
could look like at the national level. Despite the United States'
opposition to MHC at the CCW, the Directive uses similar language and
says that "[a]utonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be
designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate
levels of human judgment over the use of force." 5 6 Just as MHC is a term
searching for a greater understanding, the DoD also has not defined
"appropriate levels of human judgment." Though, in the glossary of the
Directive, a "human supervised autonomous weapon" has been defined
as "[a]n autonomous weapon system that is designed to provide human
operators with the ability to intervene and terminate engagements,
including in the event of a weapon system failure, before unacceptable
levels of damage occur."57 This additional definition sheds some light on
what it would mean for a human to supervise, but it still does not explain
what the "appropriate levels" are or how there might be MHC.
The Directive as a whole struggles with the problem of MHC in not
defining how much control is necessary by a human. "Appropriate levels
of human judgment" does not provide any guidance as to where a human
must be involved in the OODA Loop, just as it does not give guidance as
to what level of human control must be reached on Sharkey's Levels of
Control, two concepts that will be explained in detail below. So, while
the United States has adopted similar regulatory language to that of
MHC, it does not appear that it was particularly guiding in creating
effective legal protection or regulation of AWS, at least in terms of
clarity. As shown at the CCW meeting in 2014, even though the MHC
seems to have similar language as the Directive, not all states interpreted
that language to mean the same thing.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MHC
After understanding where MHC may fit within the broader scope of
international law, this section will consider what the concrete effects of
MHC may actually be. If the treaty language is adopted, states will have
to take a position on an interpretation that allows them to move forward
with the development of technology in compliance with international
5 Supra note 9 at 1(a).
56 Id. at 4(a).
5 Id. at 14, Glossary.
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obligations. The following section will explore factors that states will
have to consider when looking to understand the implications of MHC,
particularly with a greater emphasis on the "human control" aspect of
MHC.
a. Understanding MHC Through Human Placement "in, on, or
"out of the loop"
One place to begin analyzing MHC is where in the decision-making
process humans are involved. One tool to understand "the where" in the
decision-making processes of humans is the OODA Loop, a concept
created by military strategist John Boyd.58 The acronym stands for (1)
Observe, (2) Orient, (3) Decide, and (4) Act.59 It is a tool for
understanding the process along which a human can receive information,
analyze that information to make a decision, and then act upon it.
Orientation is the most important because it shapes the way the person
observes, decides, and acts based on his or her past experiences. 6 0 Boyd
successfully applied it to military strategy by using it to learn how to
speed up the decision-making process and at the same time disorient the
enemies' decision-making process, creating a tactical advantage on the
battlefield.6 '
The OODA Loop was originally developed for use by humans, but
can be applied in the field of AWS because of its related nature and
prevalent use in the military to understand the decision making process.
The description above of the OODA Loop is a simplification of the
theory developed by Boyd of what takes place in implementing an
action, but it provides a basic framework to help with a legal analysis of
MHC. Three ways of conceptualizing the involvement of humans with
weapon systems, and consequently whether there may be MHC, is
whether humans are "in the loop," "on the loop," or "out of the loop."
It is hard to imagine that any interpretation of MHC would have
humans "out of the loop," which could be understood as a human
ordering an AWS on a mission assignment and then having no further
involvement. So, an important consideration for MHC will be where "in
the loop" or "on the loop" humans need to be involved. Assuming it were
technologically possible for an AWS to be assigned a mission with an act
to destroy a target where there was no human control at any level, then
For a discussion of John Boyd's development of the OODA Loop see ROBERT
CORAM, BOYD: THE FIGHTER PILOT WHO CHANGED THE ART OF WAR (2004).
59 Id. at 334-339.
60 GRANT T. HAMMOND, THE MIND OF WAR: JOHN BOYD AND AMERICAN SECURITY 165
(2004).
61 Supra note 58, at 339.
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where could a human be added "in the loop" or "on the loop" to create
MHC? The decision stage of the OODA Loop will be the most difficult
for a machine to autonomously perform and the performance will depend
on how it has been programmed.62 Because the decision stage is the most
difficult to program, would that make that stage the most meaningful for
human involvement? Given the current technology as described above, it
is at the decision stage that a machine will most likely still need input
from a human operator on how to proceed once it has observed and
oriented itself with its surroundings because this stage will require the
compliance with the international principles of proportionality and
distinction. However, if in the future a machine were able to make its
own decision, but action included human authorization, would this be
sufficient to create MHC? Worth noting, orientation is the most
important stage of the OODA Loop because orientation can include a
person's repository of genetic history and cultural heritage, which will be
much more difficult to replicate with a machine.6 3 Under the same
scenario, could including a human at the orientation stage provide MHC?
Many of these questions do not have one simple answer. The OODA
Loop is a very simple way to consider the complex machine and human
decision-making processes, and may even be too simple for legal
analysis, but it helps give an understanding of what it may mean for a
human to be "in" or "out of the loop." However, even though the OODA
Loop helps to classify where a human is "in the loop," MHC as a concept
does not become any clearer. There are so many varied situations for the
amount of control that a human can have over a machine that the
adoption of MHC treaty language would not help clarify where "in the
loop" a human must be positioned.
b. Levels of human involvement
A different way to analyze or characterize MHC is through how
much humans are involved in the decision-making process. In an attempt
to explain a different dimension of control, Noel Sharkey developed a
way to classify levels of control. Sharkey's system quantifies control by
assigning it a number along a scale, but in some ways, it still is simply
looking at where "in" or "on the loop" a human can be placed to create
appropriate MHC. Where the OODA Loop is a tool that can help
describe where a human is involved in the decision process, Sharkey's
Levels of Control explain how much a human is involved in the decision
process. His levels are as follows:
62 William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding the Loop: Regulating the
Next Generation of War Machines, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1139, 1148 (2012).
63 Supra note 59.
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1. Human deliberates about a target before initiating any
attack.
2. Program provides a list of targets and human chooses
which to attack.
3. Program selects target and human must approve
before attack.
4. Program selects target and human has restricted time
to veto.
5. Program selects target and initiates attack without
human involvement.6 4
In his development of these levels, he has determined that levels one
and two would be acceptable levels of human control, while levels three,
four, and five would not. Sharkey argues that level three is unacceptable
because of automation bias, and levels four and five are not acceptable
because there is not a human "in the loop."
Levels one and two can both be easily considered to have humans
"in the loop." Level three begins to limit how much a human is involved
"in the loop," which is why Sharkey objects. More so, Level 4 would not
even have a human "in the loop," but rather only "on the loop," which is
to say that a human would be overseeing the decisions being made by
AWS. This is the direction that the U.S. Air Force sees its operations and
capabilities heading within the next 40 years, where humans will only
"monitor the execution of certain decisions." 65
It is questionable whether any military activity such as the goals of
the U.S. Air Force in achieving "on the loop" capabilities would comply
with any requirements of MHC. While it may be possible to say that a
human is involved in the control of AWS by overseeing the decisions it
makes, would this really be meaningful if there are hundreds or even
thousands of decisions that must be monitored by one human? Also, if a
decision is so important that a human must oversee it, then why does a
human not make the decision to begin with? While there are going to be
efficiency gains in using AWS technology, if compliance with MHC
requires meaningful human supervision, then the efficiency gains made
64 Noel Sharkey, Towards a Principle for the Human Supervisory Control of Robot
Weapons, 2 POLITICA & SOCIETA, 305-324 (May-Aug. 2014) (It.).
65 United States Air Force, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT PLAN 2009-2047
41 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas_2009.pdf.
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by autonomy may be lost in exchange for a lack of human decision
making over questions of life and death.66
As a separate way of framing the human involvement, Mark Roorda
asks those debating the legality of AWS to consider the approach taken
67
by NATO in its targeting and engagement process. Roorda proposes
that it is the human process of planning, targeting, and the legal analysis
before the launch of an AWS that allows compliance with IHL.68 The
"launch" point would be the time at which the AWS is operating on its
own and will engage targets with no further human involvement. 69 The
AWS is not operating completely independent of humans because it must
still rely on the programing and planning that was done before the launch
point. This way of looking at human involvement is not so much that a
human will be "out of the loop," but rather that a human will have
significant enough involvement before the launch to be in compliance
with IHL. It is possible that this is an approach states could take with
weapons systems, but it also raises the question of whether or not this is
still autonomy. What is described fits under the DoD definition, and
would depend on whether the weapon could "select and engage" on its
own following the launch point of human involvement.70
The examples given by the U.S. Air Force and NATO represent the
varied forms of what it may look like to have human control. It is not a
simple "yes or no" question of whether human control exists. And even
if Sharkey's levels of control can help to answer some of the questions
about where "on" or "in the loop" a human must be placed to create the
"human control" of MHC, it still does not answer all the questions about
what may actually be meaningful control by a human. This would
suggest that MHC would be just as difficult to interpret if it were adopted
as language into a treaty.
c. Does MHC imply a ban on AWS?
Because of the fear of the possible indiscriminate nature of
autonomous weaponry, several actors in the discussion of AWS have
66 See Markus Wagner, The Second Largest Military: Private Military Contractors &
State Responsibility, (Univ. of Miami Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 2010-10), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588240 (discussing how private military contractors may be
cost prohibitive if the necessary oversight mechanisms were put in place to ensure
compliance with IHL).
67 Mark Roorda, NATO's Targeting Process: Ensuring Human Control Over and
Lawful Use of 'Autonomous' Weapons 4 (Amersterdam L. Sch. Legal Stud. Res. Paper
No. 2015-13).
68 Id. at pg. 11.
69 Id. at pg. 16-17.
70 Supra note 9.
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called for a complete ban.7 ' Because MHC is still open for interpretation,
it is also still open for consideration as to whether MHC requires a ban
on AWS. Regardless, this still leaves the same issues discussed above
regarding levels of autonomy and the lack of a definition of autonomy
unresolved. Would a ban include only certain thresholds of autonomy?
In his report to the United Nations Human Rights Council, Special
Rapporteur Christof Heyns recommended the Council to call on all states
to implement a moratorium "on at least the testing, production, assembly,
transfer, acquisition, deployment and use of [lethal autonomous
robots]."72 Many NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Article 36
have rallied behind this cause to form the Campaign to Stop Killer
Robots, which adopts the same positions as those outlined in Heyns'
Report.73 The report justifies a comprehensive ban because it also calls
for the formation of a panel to research and understand the developing
technology, and then recommend policies for governing autonomous
weaponry. 74
One way the ban on AWS has been justified is by way of the
Martens Clause. At the 2015 CCW meeting in Geneva, the state of
Chile held the position that the Clause should necessarily be applied to
emerging technology.7 6 The Martens Clause requires that for issues not
covered by regulations, international humanitarian law will apply, "as
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." 77 So, the
argument is made that weapons without MHC operate in violation of the
laws of humanity and even arrive to the point of being morally
unacceptable.7 ' The "dictates of the public conscience" becomes a valid
71 See The Solution, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, (Mar. 30, 2015)
http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/the-solution/.
72 Christof Heyns. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions. A/HRC/23/47. 9 Apr. 2013 at ¶113 (Heyns uses the term LAR for
lethal autonomous robots, but defines it in the same way as AWS in DoD 3000.09).
73 Supra note 71.
74 Supra note 72, at ¶ 114.
7 Denise Garcia, The Case Against Killer Robots, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May 10, 2014
(Feb. 28, 2015) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141407/denise-garcia/the-case-
against-killer-robots.
76 Chile, a paper on "LAWS, Human Rights and Ethics." 15 April 2015. UN CCW
2015 LAWS meeting webpage.
Preamble, 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the laws and customs of war on
land, reprinted in A. Roberts and R. Guelf, Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd ed.,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 69.
78 Substantive Talks on Killer Robots Must Continue: Convention on Conventional
Weapons decision due on 14 November, FACING FINANCE (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.facing-finance.org/en/2014/11 /substantive-talks-on-killer-robots-must-
continue-convention-on-conventional-weapons-decision-due-on-14-november-2/
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source for the creation of new IHL under the Martens Clause. This
however, is extremely difficult to interpret, because it requires an
interpretation of what the "public conscience" may be, possibly relying
on public opinion, empirical social science analysis, and some way to
synthesize those findings into concrete law.79 While the Martens Clause
does provide one argument for the implementation of a ban on AWS, a
ban should not be sought as an answer to the questions arising in the
developing field of AWS.so
Opponents of a ban argue that the reasons for a complete moratorium
rest on a weak foundation. First, any arguments that the technological
capabilities of AWS could never comply with IHL are arguments that
would rest on assumptions that certain levels of technology are
unattainable.' There is no way of knowing what sort of technological
developments the future may hold. Second, there is a shaky foundation
for the moral argument of not allowing machines to make targeting
decisions of life and death. More and more of daily life has been
delegated to machines, such as the operations of factories or the ability of
cars to drive themselves, representing a societal choice to delegate these
responsibilities.82 It is possible that if a the public conscience views
killing as acceptable when the decision is made by another human, then
the public conscience may also be content with a decision to kill
delegated to an autonomous system.
Boothby argues that a ban would be "ill-advised" because the current
Article 36 review process is sufficient to regulate AWS if the process is
enforced.8 3 One of the foundations that this argument rests on is his
understanding that MHC should not "be elevated into some sort of legal
criterion that determines the acceptability of a weapon system."8 4 He
believes that it may be useful to address technology as it is now, but it is
not appropriate as a long-term solution. 5
These arguments, among others, made by opponents of a ban seem to
generally show that a complete ban would be too sweeping, extreme, and
unnecessary for effective regulation. A ban on AWS would be a
detriment to technological development in the area of weapon
79 Peter M. Asaro, Jus nascendi, robotic weapons and the Martens Clause, in ROBOT
LAw 367, 371-375 (Ryan Calo et al. eds. 2016).
80 Tyler D. Evans, At War with the Robots: Autonomous Weapons Systems and the
Martens Clause, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 697, 732-33 (2013).
81 Kenneth Anderson & Matthew C. Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous
Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won't Work and Why the Laws of War Can (AM. UNIv.
WASHINGTON C.OF L. RES. PAPER No 2013-11).
82 Id. at 15-16.
83 Supra note 43, at 3.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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technology, which would also stifle the development of rules and
regulations to accompany that development. While a ban may seem
attractive because it is a simple answer, it would not be helpful in
understanding or creating concrete laws to regulate AWS.
d. Does IHL Require Compliance with MHC?
As already mentioned above, some states and civil society groups
hold the position that IHL already requires that weapons be subject to
MHC, which as also described above incorporates the principles of
distinction and proportionality.8 6 Most scholars agree that distinction and
proportionality must govern AWS in general under IHL. But taking it a
step further, proponents of IHL already incorporating MHC hold that
because the principles of distinction and proportionality prohibit the use
of weapons that target and shoot indiscriminately, the lack of a human in
AWS constitutes indiscriminate target selection, therefore prohibiting
any autonomous target selection and firing.17 Proponents of the ban are
not only worried that the current technology does not allow AWS to
comply with distinction and proportionality, but also that technology will
never reach a point where it can comply with the principles when there is
not a human involved.88
On the other hand, Crootoff holds that AWS do not necessarily
violate the principles of distinction and proportionality by their
autonomous capabilities, but proposes they can be used in discriminate
and proportionate ways.8 9 She holds the position that autonomous
weapons are already in use with little critique, demonstrating that
compliance with IHL is already a possibility for AWS. 90 Compliance for
AWS is achieved the same way that proportionality is achieved for a
given situation: through an analysis of specific facts and the specific
context. This is important to consider because this idea is in direct
contradiction with a ban on AWS as a whole, and it raises the question of
whether a ban on AWS would be ignoring some of the capabilities of
AWS. Proponents of a ban also propose a panel that would develop laws
to regulate AWS in the future, but this would not be necessary when the
current system of lHL sufficiently governs AWS. 9' As mentioned above,
86 Supra note 35.
Supra note 64.
88 HUM. RIGHTS WATCH and INT'L HUM. RIGHTS CLINIC, ADVANCING THE DEBATE ON
KILLER ROBOTS: 12 KEY ARGUMENTS FOR A PREEMPTIVE BAN ON AWS (2014).
89 Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots are here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36
CARDOZO LAw REV. 1837, 1874 (2015).
90 Id. at 1884
91 Supra note 72 at T 114.
[Vol. VI: 151
2015-16] REGULATION OF A UTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS
compliance with IHL could be enforced through the Article 36 review
process.
If a significant number of states were ultimately to agree that MHC
were a part of IHL it could eventually become customary international
law without ever going through the process of being codified in a treaty.
But, as is usually the trouble with most international law adopted in this
form, those that oppose it would probably continue to oppose it and
claim immunity to its application through the theory of the persistent
objector. If MHC were to be adopted as language in a treaty, it would
show a greater acceptance by the international community for a standard
in an area of new technology, even if that standard may not be
particularly clear or useful.
IHL should not be understood to already incorporate MHC. As this
paper has noted above and will continue to explain below, MHC is not a
useful term because there are too many interpretations that will not be
effective for the regulation of AWS. The current IHL framework already
has the principles of distinction and proportionality to govern AWS, and
if it is determined that AWS cannot comply with these principles it
would be an illegal weapon. It is not necessary to muddy the legal waters
with the incorporation of MHC into IHL.
The concept of MHC does not appear to be able to offer a solution to
the technical, legal, moral and regulatory questions of AWS. It may
appear that the term MHC offers a sort of "jumping-off point" for
discussing what is appropriate for human involvement in weapon
systems, but it does not offer any clear answer to questions of how
human involvement is needed or what level of human involvement is
needed. The discussion generated around MHC has shown that some
form of regulation is needed, but MHC does not work to address those
concerns, and potential regulation may already have a framework under
current IHL. The concept of MHC leaves too much room open for
interpretation and does not give enough guidance on what is and is not
permissible. While the view that MHC is a clear enough concept, meant
to be fluid for future technology is admirable, it is not clear enough to be
reliable for the process of developing new technology. 92
V. How MEANINGFUL IS MHC?
The previous section of this paper discussed the legal barriers and
complications to MHC in international law. Where the previous part of
92 Contra UNITED NATIONS INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, THE WEAPONIZATION
OF INCREASINGLY AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES: CONSIDERING How MEANINGFUL
HUMAN CONTROL MIGHT MOVE THE DISCUSSION FORWARD 4 (2014).
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the paper looked at some of the "big picture" concepts that structure the
overall framework of MHC within international law along with the
"human control" of MHC, this part will consider some of the factors of
what "meaningful" actually means within MHC. This will be done by
considering some of the factors that influence the interaction of humans
and weapons systems with which they interact-factors that should be
used in considering whether MHC is useful as regulatory treaty
language. One of the first factors that can be considered is automation
bias.
a. Automation bias
When machines aid humans in making decisions, it is possible that
the operator can follow the advice of the machine, even though it may be
wrong. This is a commission error form of automation bias where the
operator incorrectly relies on the information given by the automated
machine.93 Automation bias is premised on the idea that when an
operator has contradictory information from different sources, the
operator will put a greater degree of trust in the computer-generated
information than in other sources, which may or may not be more
reliable. 94 In studies that were done on automation bias, results showed
that informing participants about the possibility of automation bias did
not significantly reduce its effect. 9 5 That is to say that the results of the
studies support the idea that automation bias is not avoidable simply by
telling a human operator to act without bias. This is not just an abstract
concept studied in laboratories, but has real life examples.
On July 3, 1988, the USS Vincennes launched two missiles at the
civilian Iran Airline Flight 655 bound from Bandar Abbas, Iran to Dubai,
UAE. None of the 290 persons onboard the Airbus A-300 survived the
missile strike.96 This attack was unintentional, and some of the primary
reasons given by the United States Government for the accident were the
escalating tensions between the two governments, an increase in Iranian
military aircraft to the Bandar Abbas airport, and a short amount of time
to a make a decision by the U.S. commander, among other factors.9 7 One
of these escalations was an unsuccessful Iranian attack on a Danish ship
93 J.E. Bahner et al., Misuse Of Automated Decision Aids: Complacency, Automation
Bias, And The Impact Of Training Experience, 66 INT'L. J. HUMAN-COMPUTER STUD.
688, 689 (2008).
94 Id. at 689.
95 Id. at 696.
96 Lt. Col. David Evans, Vincennes: A Case Study, PROCEEDINGS MAG. (Aug. 1993),
available at http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1993 -08/vincennes-case-study.
97 Dep't of Def., Formal Investigation Into the Circumstances Surrounding the
Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on July 3, 1988, 61-63.
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just one day before the USS Vincennes incident. In that attack, the Danish
ship requested assistance from the USS Montgomery, which observed
small Iranian boats firing rockets at the Danish ship. After the
Montgomery fired a warning shot, the small boats retired. 98 In addition to
the events from the previous day, other contributing factors to the USS
Vincennes incident were psychological factors such as stress, task
fixation, and an "unconscious distortion of data [which] may have played
a major role in [the] incident." 99 During the event, officers received
incorrect information from an automated machine that a military aircraft
was flying in their direction, and it appears that they made all other
available evidence fit the scenario that was received from the machine,
ultimately leading to a missile firing on an incorrectly identified civilian
aircraft. This incident is an early example of what may have been
automation bias leading to the accidental downing of a civilian aircraft.
This automation bias manifested itself in what was labeled in the
official U.S. DoD report as "scenario fulfillment." The opinions given in
the report describe how the officers involved in the incident "appear to
have distorted data flow in an unconscious attempt to make available
evidence fit a preconceived scenario."'00 The humans that were "in the
loop" of this automated decision process had a bias toward the
information they received that was automated. That bias created a
scenario that they continued to fulfill in their minds, which ultimately led
to the misunderstanding that caused the downing of the civilian aircraft.
This is a situation of a human "in the loop" because the automated
information of a military airplane flying overhead was given to a human
that then authorized the launching of a missile.
Automation bias is important to consider in MHC because even
when a human may have a supervisory role or a minor "in the loop" role
with an automated machine, it raises the question of whether this role is
actually meaningful. It may be that with some automated systems, a
human can be "in the loop" to a certain degree and meaningful control is
more easily achieved than with a different automated system. Will MHC
be a rule that can be easily applied in cases of different types of AWS? It
may be the case that the rule is flexible enough for different types of
AWS and can be applied to future AWS as well, but this is only because
MHC is a vague enough concept that it can be interpreted broadly.
Complex factors such as automation bias and scenario fulfillment, which
may play out different by the facts of situation, question the usefulness of
such a concept as MHC.
98 Id. at 16-17.
99 Id. at 63.
100 Id.
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b. Automation-induced complacency
In addition to automation bias, a related concept is automation
complacency. This is the idea that under heightened work conditions, an
operator of an automated system will not notice malfunctions or will fail
to correct errors by the automation because of the busyness of focusing
on other manual tasks.'0 ' Continued research seems to support this
concept of automation-induced complacency, even though participants in
studies seemed to deny the conclusions that any sort of automation
complacency existed when self-assessed.1 02 These scientific findings may
still require further research, and more theories will likely continue to
develop as does technology. But, they present considerations of why the
law needs to consider what MHC really means. Is a human's control
meaningful if it becomes complacent?
As a correction to human complacency, Parasuramnan has proposed
adaptive automation.'03 This is the idea that when a human operator is at
a greater stress level and must manually operate more controls, the
automated machine will be programmed to operate at a greater degree of
automation.104 However, when the operator is at a lower level of stress,
the automated machine will be programmed to operate at lower degree of
automation so as to avoid such complacency. o0 This is a way of keeping
the operator more engaged when she is in periods of less stress and has
more time to engage in operation.
A problem with adaptive automation is that it points directly to the
issue that a greater degree of human involvement may be necessary in
situations of high stress. If an operator of a machine will fail to notice an
error that comes from automated systems when she is in high stress
situations, then could it simply mean that another operator is needed?
Automation complacency is not a factor that would be assisted much by
the adoption of MHC. It is not clear whether automation complacency is
a strong enough problem that would mean MHC is not established in the
operation of a machine, and it would also not be clear if solutions such as
adaptive automation would establish MHC.
101 Raja Parasurana & P.A. Hancock, Mitigating the Adverse Effects of Workload,
Stress, and Fatigue with Adaptive Automation, in PERFORMANCE UNDER STRESS 45, 49
(Peter A. Hancock, ed. et al., 2008).
102 NASRINE BAGHERI & GREG A. HAMIESON, CONSIDERING SUBJECTICE TRUST AND
MONITORING BEHAVIOR IN ASSESSING AUTOMATION-INDUCED 'COMPLACENCY' (2004).
103 Supra note 101, at 46.
104 Id.
105 Id.
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c. Automation Bias and Complacency in Other Fields
Automation bias and automation complacency are not something that
exist solely in the field of weapons technology. One example of
automation bias in another field is in the area of healthcare through
clinical decision support systems (CDSS). The CDSS are automated
systems that aim to provide physicians and their assistants information
on a patient through alerts, reminders, diagnostic assistance, and therapy
planning and critiquing.1 06 Goddard, looks at research that has been done
in the medical field on CDDS and compares it with other areas where
automated technology is used to conclude that more research needs to be
done to know whether automation bias is a result of overreliance on
technology. 0 7 The research relied on shows that in twelve percent of the
cases a physician would drop his incorrect diagnosis for a correct
diagnosis from the CDDS, and in six percent of the cases the physician
would drop his correct diagnosis for an incorrect diagnosis from the
CDDS.'os While this does show that there was a six percent net gain in
diagnostic accuracy from the CDDS, it does also show evidence of what
can be considered automation bias. This may be considered allowable or
acceptable in diagnostics for certain medical issues, but will it be
considered acceptable when the question arises for AWS?
Another more closely related field where studies have been done on
automation complacency is in monitoring of air traffic. Studies showed
that human monitoring of automated systems had a poor rate of detection
of anomalies when the operators were engaged in other manual tasks.' 09
An interesting finding of this study was that air traffic controllers were
more likely to notice potential conflicts under active control conditions
(human operated) than under passive monitoring conditions
(automated)."o And the time needed to correct a conflict under active
controls as opposed to passive monitoring conditions during heavy traffic
was significantly less, which could be critical during an emergency
situation.'
106 Kate Goddard, Abdul Roudsari, & Jeremy Wyatt. Decision Support and Automation
Bias: Methodology and Preliminary Results of a Systematic Review, 164 INT'L PERSP. IN
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Studies such as these in other fields may be useful for supporting the
idea of keeping humans "in the loop" and may provide a useful
comparison for the field of AWS and what it means to have MHC.
However, these studies could also be interpreted as finding advantages to
automated systems as well. Automation bias and complacency could be
seen as factors that show a problem with human involvement. If
computer systems had complete autonomy such as monitoring for their
own diagnosis errors and air-traffic anomalies, could this reduce errors
even more? The arguments of automation bias and complacency as a
need for MHC may loose their strength if technology improves to the
point of bringing automated and autonomous system errors close to zero.
Automation bias and automation complacency both show ways that
MHC will be difficult to interpret. It is especially difficult to interpret the
word "meaningful." This is because even when control is taken away
from a machine and given to a human, there may be issues of a human
still being biased or complacent if not enough control is given. It is
possible that diplomats seek MHC as a way to account for automation
bias and complacency, but the term is still too vague to give any
guidance to states seeking to develop AWS that may be on the threshold
of what it means to have MHC. There needs to be a way to guide states
forward in what is permissible for developing technologies, but the MHC
framework does not appear to be particularly useful in doing that.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a need for international laws that regulate the development
and use of AWS, but perhaps the system already in place for the
regulation of weapons is adequate. Figuring out the best solution for
regulation is particularly challenging when it is an area that is
technologically new and continuing to develop.
While MHC may provide benefits from being simple in language, it
fails to be useful for the same reasons. The proposed treaty language
would not provide any significant guidance when it came to the
development of weapon systems. It may be appealing in that MHC could
be easily used as an argument for weapon systems that do not comply,
but that looks at more prescriptive reasoning for a ban without allowing
for any proscriptive rulemaking for states that will continue the
development of AWS even if a ban were attempted at an international
level.
The complexities of weapon systems can involve humans in a variety
of different ways as was pointed out above with the distinction of "in the
loop" and "on the loop." There are also the complexities of interpreting
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how meaningful MHC must actually be because of problems such as
automation bias and automation complacency. The language of MHC
adopted in a treaty would not help to address these nuances and
complexities of AWS.
The discussion continues regarding MHC, but the discussion should
consider dropping the term altogether and look for a better approach to
regulate AWS. The current framework of IHL, with its inclusion of the
principles of distinction and proportionality, is likely already sufficient
for the regulation of AWS. It does not appear that states will stop
pursuing the development of AWS technology, but MHC does not
appear to help states in any significant way to know whether they would
be in compliance with international law. That is not say that there is
some perfect formulation available that will create a bright line rule of
what will make AWS acceptable when it comes to human involvement,
but MHC does not appear to be the appropriate step forward for the
international community.
